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Evaluating the Standards of Family Medical Leave Act Claims
Introduction
Americans faced with significant medical issues should not have to choose between taking
medical leave and maintaining employment. To combat the panic often created by this difficult
choice, Congress passed the Family Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA”) in 1993.1 The FMLA was
designed to protect medical leave by qualified employees under specific circumstances. 2 The
FMLA grants employees redress against employers who fail to comply with the act.

3

An

employee can bring a claim of “interference” with “exercise of rights” under U.S.C.A. §2615(a)(2)
if his employer has not accorded her an FMLA-granted right. 4

For instance, an employer’s

refusal to return an employee to his position after taking FMLA granted leave could be a basis for
bringing a FMLA “interference with rights” claim. In addition, the statute provides, that “it shall
be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any
individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.” 5 Thus, an employee
cannot be punished for insisting on her right to leave even if she is awarded it. For example,
awarding leave but later discharging the employee for having taken it would be retaliation. Finally,
an employee can bring an “interference with proceedings or inquiries” claim if an employer has
penalized him for bringing a claim or testifying in a proceeding under U.S.C.A. §2615(b).6 There

1

29 U.S.C.A. §2601
Id. §2601
3
Id. § 2615
4
See 29 U.S.C.A. §2615(a) (defining prohibited acts as interference with (1) the “exercise of
rights [such that] it shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the
exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter and (2) “to
discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice
made unlawful by this subchapter.”)
5
29 U.S.C.A. §2615(a)(2).
6
See 29 U.S.C.A. §2615(b) (defining the other prohibited act as “interference with proceedings
or inquiries [as] it shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or in any other manner
2

1

is no intent requirement for an interference with rights claim since the only issue is whether the
employer provided the plaintiff with the FMLA rights to which she is entitled.7 There is, however,
an intent requirement for retaliation claims, and this Comment will focus on latter.8 In such cases,
employees who suffered adverse employment decisions after exercising FMLA granted rights
must show their employers’ decisions were based on retaliatory intent.9
To bring a retaliation claim, an employee will need to meet criteria as outlined by case law
and the FMLA. Courts disagree on the application of various discriminatory intent standards to
the employee’s offered evidence and the circumstances of each case. 10 The discrepancy often
follows from differing applications of the discrimination analysis under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. Courts often apply their Title VII discrimination analysis to other claims arising under
federal statutes that also require discriminatory intent. In the absence of more direct evidence of
discrimination, an employee bringing a discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act with only circumstantial evidence is held to the burden-shifting framework outlined by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green.11 Under this framework, once an employee
satisfies his prima facie case, the employer must provide a non-discriminatory justification for the
adverse employment action she took.12 Currently, courts disagree under Title VII as to which

discriminate against any individual because such individual… has filed any charge, or has
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding, under or related to this subchapter… has
given, or is about to give, any information in connection with any inquiry or proceeding relating
to any right provided under this subchapter; or has testified, or is about to testify, in any inquiry
or proceeding relating to any right provided under this subchapter.)
7
Goelzer v. Sheboygan Cnty., Wis., 604 F.3d 987, 995 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Kauffman v. Fed.
Exp. Corp., 426 F.3d 880, 884 (7th Cir. 2005)).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Rebecca Michaels, Legitimate Reasons for Firing: Must They Honestly Be Reasonable? 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 2643, 2657 (2003).
11
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
12
Id.
2

standard the employer-provided reason should be held. 13 The Seventh Circuit has held the
employer to a minimum standard, requiring only that the employer had an honest belief in their
justification;14 in contrast, the Sixth Circuit has held the employer to a higher standard, requiring
that the employer’s honest belief also be reasonable.15 Thus far, the Second, Tenth, and D.C.
Circuits have adopted the “honest belief only” standard advanced by the Seventh Circuit, while
the First, Fourth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the Sixth Circuit’s honest and
reasonable belief standard.16 The remaining circuit courts have not weighed in on the split. In
2012, the Sixth Circuit extended its reasonable and honest belief rule beyond the realm of Title
VII to a FMLA claim in evaluating employer monitoring of the legitimacy of employee FMLA
leave.17
Universally applying the heightened honest and reasonable standard to FMLA retaliation
cases would serve FMLA policy goals while giving employers a guideline for behavior and giving
employees the protection they deserve. Ensuring that a universal standard is applied when
evaluating employer conduct in a FMLA claim would prevent litigants from manipulating the
system by choosing a venue more favorable to their position. The standard used to determine
employer intent can be determinative of the end result in discrimination claims. All courts should
adopt the Sixth Circuit’s reasonableness requirement when applying the honest belief standard to
FMLA “interference with rights” claims.
To bring a retaliation claim under the FMLA, an employee will need to meet elements as
outlined by the statute and relevant case law. The statute makes it “unlawful for an employer ‘to

13

Michaels, supra note 10, at 2643.
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 F.3d 274, 276 (6th Cir. 2012).
14
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discharge or in any manner discriminate against’ any employee for opposing any practice the
FMLA makes unlawful.”18 For instance, an employer refusal to return an employee to his position
after taking FMLA leave could provide a basis for bringing either a FMLA interference claim or
a retaliation claim. The former would simply focus on whether the employee was entitled to the
relevant benefit (leave or reinstatement) while the latter would focus on whether the employer
intended to deny such a benefit. In this case, the former analysis would tend to crowd out the
latter. In a case in which the employer granted leave and then reinstatement but later, say, denied
a promotion because the employee had taken such leave, only the retaliation claim would lie.
With respect to retaliation, a plaintiff can bring a FMLA claim under either a direct or
indirect method of proof.19 Under the direct method, “a plaintiff must present evidence that her
employer took a materially adverse action against her because of her protected activity.”20 Under
the indirect method, a plaintiff must prove that he was treated less favorably after exercising his
FMLA right than other similarly situated employees who did not exercise an FMLA right, and he
was otherwise performing the job in a satisfactory manner.21
Furthermore, the causation standard to be applied to FMLA “interference with rights”
claims requiring discriminatory or retaliatory intent is unsettled. To date, the United States
Supreme Court has settled the appropriate causation standard for ADEA claims and Title VII
retaliation claims, holding that plaintiffs must meet a “but for” causation standard to prevail on
claims provided by those statutes. While the Supreme Court has yet to settle whether the “but for”

18

Goelzer v. Sheboygan Cnty., Wis., 604 F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§2615(a)(2)).
19 Goelzer v. Sheboygan Cnty., Wis., at 990 (citing Burnett v. LFW, Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 477 (7th
Cir. 2006)).
20
Id.
21
29 U.S.C.A. §2615(a)(2).
4

causation standard is also appropriate for FMLA retaliation claims, the Seventh Circuit did not
feel compelled to follow the earlier Supreme Court Age Discrimination in Employment Act, (the
“ADEA”), decision of Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.22
Considering the level of causation required for a FMLA retaliation claim in Goelzer v.
Sheboygan Cnty., Wis., the Seventh Circuit distinguished the ADEA from the FMLA, and required
only a “motivating factor” causation standard to prevail on a FMLA “interference with rights”
claim based on retaliatory intent.23 Years after the Gross and Goelzer opinions, in Univ. of Texas
Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, the Supreme Court upheld its “but for” causation standard in the context
of Title VII retaliation claims.24 However, the Court did not directly address Goelzer, nor did it
declare whether the “but for” standard applies to FMLA claims. 25 Therefore, there is an
uncertainty over whether the appropriate causation standard for FMLA retaliation claims is the
Seventh Circuit’s “motivating factor” standard or the “but for” causation standard.
This Comment will discuss the current uncertainty over the correct standard to be applied
to FMLA retaliation claims requiring the employer either have discriminatory or retaliatory intent
for the adverse employment decision. The Comment will argue for the universal application of the
heightened honest and reasonable belief standard for FMLA “interference with rights” claims.
Additionally, in light of recent decisions, this Comment predicts that the United States Supreme
Court will rule that the appropriate standard for FMLA retaliation claims is “but for” causation.
Part I discusses the background of the differing variations of the honest belief rule, the legislative
intent and relevant provisions of the Family Medical Leave Act, as well as the current state of the

22

Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009).
Goelzer v. Sheboygan Cnty., Wis., at 990.
24
Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517 (2013).
25
Id.
23
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split among the circuits regarding discrimination and the application of the “honest belief” rule.
Part II argues that the honest and reasonable rule is the appropriate standard to be applied to FMLA
“interference with rights” claims. Part III contends that the United States Supreme Court will
likely reject the “motivating factor” causation standard for FMLA “interference with rights” with
retaliatory intent claims, following previous Supreme Court decisions that “but for” causation is
the appropriate standard according to the language of the statute. Part IV concludes this Comment.
I. Background
A. The Family Medical Leave Act
The FMLA was enacted to protect the needs of American family members in the
workplace.26 The Act provides medical leave under defined circumstances.27 It was promulgated
in response to the changing needs of the American family.28 Additionally, the “FMLA serves as
an anti-discrimination statute that aims to cure gender-related discrimination in the workplace.”29
In enacting the FMLA, Congress paid particular attention to family dynamics. It feared that parentemployees were forced “to choose between caring for their loved ones and retaining their
employment.” 30 Congress was also concerned that there was “inadequate job security for
employees who have serious health conditions that prevent them from working for temporary

26

29 U.S.C. §2601(b)(1).
Id. §2601(b)(2).
28
Id. §2601(b)(1).
29
Brandon Sipherd & Christopher Volpe, Evaluating the Legality of Employer Surveillance
Under the Family and Medical Leave Act: Have Employers Crossed the Line?, 27 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L. J. 467 (2010) (citing 29 U.S.C. §2601(b)(4) and citing Kilvitis v. County of
Luzerne, 52 F. Supp. 2d 403, 409 (M.D. Pa. 1999); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 550 n.10
(2004) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
30
Stacy A. Hickox, The Elusive Right to Reinstatement Under the Family Medical Leave Act, 91
KY L. J. 477, 480 (2003), (citing S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 6 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3, 8).
27
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periods.”31 In particular, a Small Business Administration survey was presented to Congress to
show how little job security employees are afforded in the absence of employer-guaranteed
minimal period of medical leave.32 The survey estimated that “70% to 90% of employers offered
only leave of a variable or unspecified length.”33
In passing the FMLA, Congress expressed a desire to solidify the right to take medical
leave without fear that taking such leave would lead to termination. As such, the FMLA was
promulgated to address a specific need in the American workplace. 34 The length of leave as
granted by the FMLA directly alleviates the forced choice between making a living and caring for
one’s health or the health of a family member. The FMLA reflects Congress’ recognition of the
significance of the American family unit as a crucial foundation in society. A statute enacted to
cure workplace unfairness, a topic central to the fabric of our culture, should be held to a
heightened standard to ensure its purpose is not undermined without adequate justification.
The FMLA grants leave to eligible employees for specified family and medical reasons. 35
Eligible employees may take up to twelve work weeks of FMLA leave in a twelve-month period:
for the birth of the employee’s child and for that child’s care, to place the child with the employee
for adoption or foster care, to care for the employee’s spouse, parent, son, or daughter with a
serious health condition, when the employee is unable to perform the functions of his or her
position due to the employee’s own serious health condition, or because of a qualifying emergency
arising from the employee’s family member being on active duty.36 The FMLA provides a remedy

31

29 U.S.C. §2601(a)(4).
Id.
33
Id.
34
Hickox, supra note 22, at 481, (citing S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 14 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 17 (estimate by economists Eileen Trzcinski and William Alpert)).
35
29 U.S.C. §2601(b)(2).
36
Id. §2612(a)(1).
32

7

for employees denied mandated leave or who feel their employer has punished them for exercising
an FMLA right.37 For instance, an employee who is terminated or demoted in anticipation of
statutorily granted absence from work might bring a FMLA retaliation claim.

Generally,

retaliation claims are often provided by Congress to prevent a chilling effect on employees who
fear repercussions for exercising the statute-provided right. Under the FMLA, to make a prima
facie case of interference with retaliatory intent, a plaintiff must prove: she was engaged in FMLA
protected activity, the employer knew the employee was exercising her FMLA rights, the
employee suffered an adverse employment action, and a causal connection existed between the
protected FMLA activity and the adverse employment action.38
B. Proving Discrimination – From Title VII to the FMLA
In response to the Civil Rights Movement and the Women’s Movement, Congress
recognized the many problems associated with biases in the American workplace, as minority
employees and women were shut out of jobs and received lower pay overall. Antidiscrimination
statutes like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and subsequent legislation like the Americans with
Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), and the ADEA were enacted to address related issues.39 However,
employers have adapted to these antidiscrimination statutes and are no longer as overtly
discriminatory.40 As a result, the courts have developed elaborate structures to infer discriminatory
treatment from workplace interaction in an effort to carry out the original purpose of these statutes.

37

29 U.S.C.A. §2615(a)
Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Arban v. West Publ’g Corp.
345, F.3d 390, 404 (6th Cir. 2003)) (internal citations omitted).
39
Ernest F. Lidge III, Disparate Treatment Employment Discrimination and an Employer’s
Good Faith: Honest Mistakes, Benign Motives, and Other Sincerely Held Beliefs,
36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 45, 50 (2011).
40
Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of
Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003).
38
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An employee has two theories at his disposal to prove employment discrimination under
Title VII,41 first, disparate treatment claim under a theory of employer intentional discrimination,
and, second, a disparate impact claim, which does not require proof of discriminatory intent.42 The
latter theory will not be the focus on this Comment.
“Intentional discrimination is not always easy to prove because, in most circumstances,
employers will not overtly discriminate and plaintiffs will not have direct evidence of the
employer's intent to discriminate.”43 As such, employees can prove disparate treatment claims
with circumstantial evidence of employer discriminatory intent as guided by the principles
announced by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 44 In
McDonnell Douglas, the Court articulated the framework to be applied when the employee seeks
to prove disparate treatment discrimination without direct evidence of discriminatory intent.45
The first requirement is that the employee brings a discrimination claim, he bears the
burden of proving a prima facie case.46 To prove a prima facie case of discrimination under the
McDonnell Douglas framework, the employee must show that he: “belongs to the protected
class…applied and was minimally qualified for the position, an adverse employment action
occurred,

and

the

employer

continued

to

seek

applicants

after

employee

was

terminated/rejected.” 47 Once the employee has made her prima facie case, “a mandatory

41

Lidge III, supra note 22, at 50.
Id.
43
Lidge III, supra note 22 at 50, (citing U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711, 716 (1983)).
44
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
45
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
46
Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 805 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Monette v. Electronic Data
Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1186 (6th Cir. 1996)).
47
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, at 792. (As discussed in Dana W. Atchley, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: You Can’t Honestly Believe That! 25 J. LEGIS. 229, 238 (1999),
this framework was refined in: Texas Dep’t. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
42
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presumption of discrimination is created.”48 The burden of production then shifts to the employer
to provide a non-discriminatory justification for the adverse employment action.49 If the employer
cannot provide a non-discriminatory reason, the employee wins his discrimination claim.50 If the
employer provides a non-discriminatory reason, the burden of persuasion shifts back to the
employee51 to prove the employer’s non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action
was, “actually a pretext intended to hide unlawful discrimination.” 52 An employee can show
pretext for discrimination by providing evidence, for example, that the employer’s supposed
reason was false, was not the motivating reason for the decision, or has never been a reason for
termination of an employee in the past.53
C. The Split – The Honest Belief Rule
Despite the Supreme Court’s seemingly clear instructions for establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination, jurisdictions are split as to the standard to be applied when considering the
employer’s non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.54 The Seventh Circuit
outlined its “pure” honest belief rule in McCoy v. WGN Cont’l Broad. Co. holding that the question
turns on whether the employer “honestly believed in the reasons it has offered for its actions.”55

(1981), United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983) and St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. V. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)).
48
Smith v. Chrysler Corp., at 805.
49
Smith v. Chrysler Corp., at 805.
50
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
51
Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 805 (6th Cir. 1998)
52
Id., at 805 (citing Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1186 (6th Cir. 1996)).
53
Smith v. Chrysler Corp., at 806 (citing Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876,
883 (6th Cir. 1996)).
54
Michaels, supra note 10, at 2657.
55
McCoy v. WGN Cont'l Broad. Co., 957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1992).
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The court went on to state that, “so long as [the employer] believed [in his justification], its
business judgment will not be second-guessed by federal courts.”56
The Sixth Circuit, however, in Smith v. Chrysler Corp. held employers to a higher
standard.57 It adopted the honest ”plus” reasonable belief regime by stating that an employeroffered non-discriminatory basis for the adverse employment action would be considered honestly
held if it could show a “reasonable reliance on the particularized facts that were before it at the
time the decision was made.”58 In the absence of proof to support reasonableness of the employer
action, then, “the ‘honest belief’ rule does not apply.”59 The court also mentioned that even if the
employer meets this burden of reasonableness, “the protection afforded by the rule is not
automatic.”60
Fortunately for the employer, this burden is not so daunting.

When determining

reasonableness, the court considers the relevant circumstances. 61 “We do not require that the
decisional process used by the employer be optimal or that it left no stone unturned. Rather, the
key inquiry is whether the employer made a reasonably informed and considered decision before
taking an adverse employment action.” 62 Thus, the employer must provide evidence of the
reasonableness of its actions,63 but employee evidence of the unreasonableness of the employer’s
actions creates a pretext issue.64
II. Sixth Circuit Standard and its Application to FMLA Discrimination Claims
56

Id.
Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998), citing Cf. Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).
62
Id.
63
Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998).
64
Id.
57
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A. Selecting the Appropriate Standard
Courts should adopt the Sixth Circuit’s honest “plus” reasonable standard requiring
employer reasonableness in addition to honesty when making the adverse employment decision.
The Sixth Circuit’s reasonableness standard should be applied to all employer-provided
justifications in retaliation FMLA cases, as holding employers to a heightened standard would suit
the statute’s purpose. By contrast, if courts were to adopt the Seventh Circuit’s standard, an
employer would be able provide any reason for adverse action, even an arbitrary one, so as long
as she honestly believed it.65
Opponents of a reasonableness standard might ask why the courts should even inquire into
the employer’s intent and not just defer to employer’s business judgment.66 This argument is
flawed, however, because it does not adequately address the practical consequences of giving an
employer such broad latitude to make employment decisions where FMLA leave is at stake.
Inquiring into employer intent is necessary because otherwise employers could avoid the statutory
commands by punishing workers for taking leave, thus chilling their right to do so. In the current
“at will” employment environment, workers need protection from discriminatory decisions
disguised as good faith intent to protect the company. The Seventh Circuit “honest only” standard
unfairly favors employers and would render it very difficult for employees to succeed on FMLA
retaliation claims.

Under the Seventh Circuit’s standard, employers can easily rebut any

circumstantial proof of employer discriminatory intent without a showing of reasonableness.
By contrast, the heightened Sixth Circuit “honest and reasonable” standard adequately
serves both employer and employee interests. It serves employer interests by having a uniform

65
66

Kariotis v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 1997).
Michaels, supra note 10, at 2659.
12

system so employers know how to conduct themselves in making adverse employment decisions.
Requiring reasonableness also serves employee interests by protecting them from illegitimate
adverse employment decisions related to statutorily-granted leave.

This reasonableness

requirement will serve public policy as it acknowledges that employees are in the more vulnerable
position in negotiations and the at will employment relationship. The purpose of the FMLA was
to grant medical leave in the workplace in defined circumstances.67 If employers could provide
any reason and the courts would accept it so long as it was honest, individuals would be deterred
from taking their statutorily-granted leave. This chilling effect would have negative implications
that would cost the government and tax payers. In balancing employer and employee rights, there
is more to lose for employees when an employer can provide any justification for the adverse
employment action than there is to lose for an employer who must provide more than an honest
reason.
Allowing honesty alone would encourage employers to make employment decisions absent
adequate thought. Without this heightened standard, employers would terminate first and think of
a lawful justification later if a lawsuit arises. Requiring reasonableness ensures a more just result
than merely asking for any reason and taking it as the truth. While reasonableness provides a value
in itself, it is also a tool to test honesty. As such, considering the reasonableness of the decision
would more accurately ascertain whether the belief was honestly held. Under this reasoning, the
trier of fact could utilize reasonableness as a more concrete gauge of whether the decision actually
was honest. Thinking of reasonableness in this way would resolve the worry presented by the
lower honesty-only standard that employers would avoid liability by providing any arbitrary
decision. Considering whether the decision was both honest and reasonable speaks to employer

67

29 U.S.C.A. § 2601.
13

credibility. To avoid inconsistent employer explanations, inquiring into the reasonableness of a
decision would also help maintain judicial credibility.
Proponents of deferring to employer business judgment might argue as the Seventh Circuit
did in McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. and not inquire into the business judgment
of the employer-defendant so long as he had an honest belief in making the judgment.68 However,
such an approach does not hold employers to a high enough standard. Making a discriminatory
decision is not akin to a business decision normally afforded this protection.69 Employees are
typically in an inferior bargaining position to employers, especially in considering the current
American economic state. To protect workers from discriminatory and retaliatory employment
actions, the courts should require the employer have a legitimate and reasonable justification for
adverse employment actions when an employee has made his prima facie case of discrimination.70
While the courts typically do not inject themselves into the business judgment of employers, public
policy, as manifested in the FMLA, should support an exception. There would effectively be no
other recourse for employees if the courts could not hold employers to a higher standard because
the standard of honesty alone is too easy to meet.
The antidiscrimination statutes stand as exceptions to the “at will” presumption when an
employer has unlawfully discriminated. While it may seem that by requiring reasonableness this
Comment is proposing the abolishment of the “at will” rule, the employer right to terminate an
employee “at will” does not apply when an employer is violating a federal statute. For example,
an employer cannot terminate an employee in defiance of the FMLA, but absent such contrary

68

McCoy v. WGN Cont'l Broad. Co., 957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1992).
For instance, an office manager’s choice to switch to a more cost-efficient office supplier
might be a business decision afforded the protection of the business judgment rule.
70
Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 805 (6th Cir. 1998).
69
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conduct, the “at will” presumption remains intact. Just like the antidiscrimination statutes, this
Comment is proposing only to do away with the “at will” rule when an employer has unlawfully
acted in violation of a statute like the FMLA.
If employers are careful in their adverse employment decisions, the honest belief “plus”
reasonableness standard will not negatively affect them. Additionally, just as the cost was minimal
and the benefits were substantial when employers were required to provide the FMLA leave, the
same effect would come from requiring that employers provide a reasonable justification that is
also honestly held.71
B. The Sixth Circuit Position Furthers the Policy Goals of the FMLA
Extending the scope of claims to which the honest and reasonable belief standard should
be applied will benefit employees and serve the purpose of the FMLA. For the first time, in 2012,
the Sixth Circuit extended the scope of its honest and reasonable belief standard in Seeger v.
Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co.72 It applied the honest “plus” reasonable standard beyond the realm
of a Title VII discrimination claim to a FMLA claim brought because an employer monitored of
the legitimacy of FMLA-provided employee leave.73 An employee took FMLA leave to recover
from a herniated disc in his back.74 He was later terminated for supposed disability fraud after the
employer discovered that he was walking around a crowded Oktoberfest festival during his FMLA
leave.75 The Sixth Circuit applied its modified honest belief rule and affirmed the employee’s

Hickox, supra note 22, at 481, stating (“[t]estimony before Congress confirmed that voluntary
provisions of leave prior to the passage of FMLA not only lessened employers' hiring costs,
training costs, turnover rate, and absenteeism, but also ‘command[ed] the respect and loyalty’ of
employees.” citing S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 14 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 16
(testimony of Geoffrey Carter, small business owner)).
72
Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 F.3d 274, 276 (6th Cir. 2012).
73
Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell, at 276.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 280
71
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termination. 76 The court stated, “[t]he determinative question is not whether Seeger actually
committed fraud, but whether CBT reasonably and honestly believed that he did.”

77

In so

reasoning, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer holding that the
rationale behind the decision to terminate was reasonable.78
Requiring a reasonableness standard runs parallel to the policy goals of the FMLA. The
FMLA was passed to protect workers from negative employment actions as a result of taking
necessary medical leave.79 To hold employers to a standard of reasonableness when evaluating
their actions in FMLA discrimination and retaliation cases would more fully cover employeeneeds. The heightened standard ensures fairness. If employers know they will be held to a
standard of reasonableness, they will be more careful in their decision making process and
employees will feel secure exercising their statutory rights. Requiring reasonableness will deter
employers from retaliating against employees. Employees would feel more comfortable taking
leave under the heightened standard because they would have peace of mind knowing that they
cannot be terminated unreasonably. The Sixth Circuit standard ensures fairness and provides a
more just outcome than the lower “honesty only” standard.
D. The Seventh Circuit’s Position is Contrary the Policy Goals of the FMLA
The Seventh Circuit decided Kariotis v. Navistar Inter. Transp. Corp. 80 by applying its
lower honest belief only standard to a FMLA claim. In Kariotis, an employee brought a FMLA
claim against her employer after she was terminated for supposed disability fraud following knee

76

Id., at 287
Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 F.3d 274, 287 (6th Cir. 2012).
78
Id.
79
29 U.S.C.A. § 2601(b).
80
131 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 1997).
77
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replacement surgery. 81 The court reasoned, “while the company may have been mistaken in
concluding Kariotis actually committed fraud, at the very least it had an honest belief that she had
done so.” 82 Management was suspicious of the validity of the employee’s leave, 83 but the
employer’s investigation was left to non-experts and did not lead to any conclusive proof of
fraud.84 Moreover, the employer declined to follow up with the employee’s physician. 85 Upon
termination, the employee’s physician wrote a letter claiming that the charge of disability fraud
was “preposterous” based on her current physical condition.86
The court nevertheless ruled against the employee, noting that, “the company was careless
in not checking its facts before firing her… While the decision arguably was wrong, she has not
shown it was based on illegal discrimination.”87 According to the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiff’s
burden is to challenge the honesty of the company’s reasons, and to allege facts tending to prove
the falseness of the employer’s supposed reason for its adverse action.88 In so reasoning, the court
gave employers broad latitude in evaluating the process linked to the adverse employment action.89
“No matter how medieval a firm’s practices, no matter how high-handed its decisional process, no
matter how mistaken the firm’s managers, the laws barring discrimination do not interfere.” 90
Applying its honest only standard, the court held that the employer’s honest belief defeated the
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employee’s FMLA claim.91 In so holding, the Seventh Circuit denied the employee the relief she
would have received if the court had considered reasonableness.
The Seventh Circuit’s broad employer-beneficial standard and outdated reasoning does not
reflect the challenges currently faced by employees and do not hold employers to a strict enough
standard. Under this reasoning, an employer will not be held liable so long as it can provide any
reason for the decision because it is nearly impossible to show a belief is not honestly held under
the Seventh Circuit’s standard. The honest and reasonable standard would better serve the
practical concerns for which antidiscrimination statutes were enacted.
Allowing an employer to put forward any non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action after an unreasonable investigation is contrary to the policy goals of the FMLA.
Not inquiring as to the reasonableness of the employer’s decision would make it too easy for
employers to discriminate and not be held accountable. Taking an employer at its word without
inquiring as to reasonableness of a decision could have a considerable chilling effect on the amount
of FMLA leave taken by employees. There are countless honest belief reasons an employer could
provide to the court after the termination has occurred, and employees will have this easy standard
in mind when deciding whether they should take FMLA-provided leave. Employees will not risk
exercising their FMLA right to leave if reasonableness is not required.

Once an adverse

employment action occurs, the damage will be done, because the lower “honesty only” standard is
easy for employers to meet.
III. Predicted Causation Standard for FMLA Retaliation Claims
Another area of FMLA claim uncertainty is the causation standard to be applied to FMLA
retaliation claims. To date, the United States Supreme Court has settled the causation standard
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only for ADEA claims92 and Title VII retaliation claims.93 Based on the relevant case law, there
are currently two causation standards of relevance to the discussion. The Supreme Court required
a “but for” standard for an ADEA claim in Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.94 Shortly thereafter, the
Seventh Circuit applied the lesser “motivating factor” standard for a FMLA “retaliation claim in
Goelzer v. Sheboygan Cnty., Wis.95 Several years after the Seventh Circuit Goelzer opinion, the
Supreme Court again opted for a “but for” standard for a Title VII retaliation claim in Univ. of
Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar.96 In 1991, had Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
and altered the causation standard for status discrimination claims under § 703 (those based on
race, sex, religion and national origin) to provide for merely “motivating factor” causation.97 The
amendments did not explicitly address retaliation claims under § 704 of the statute.98 The United
States Supreme Court relied heavily on this difference to refuse to apply motivating factor
causation.99 Its view in Gross that causal language otherwise means “but for” causation, therefore
led it to apply that standard to Title VII retaliation claims.100
The Supreme Court has not yet been presented with a FMLA retaliation claim to settle the
uncertainty over the appropriate standard to be applied. In light of the relevant case law and upon
statutory interpretation, it is likely the Supreme Court will follow its previous cases and reject the
Seventh Circuit “motivating factor” standard. Based on Gross and Nassar, the Supreme Court
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would rule that “but for” causation is required to succeed on a FMLA retaliation claim. In
comparing the text of the FMLA to the texts of the ADEA and Title VII, similarities are apparent.
These similarities indicate that the appropriate standard in evaluating retaliation claims must be
“but for” causation.
A. The “But For” Standard as Decided in Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.
The United States Supreme Court decision Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.,101 settled the
causation standard for ADEA claims.102 Notably, the court held that instructing the jury to apply
a “mixed motive” standard is never proper in an ADEA case. 103 This could suggest that such a
standard is also improper in a FMLA retaliation case.
In Gross, an employee brought suit against his employer under the ADEA for a job
demotion.104 The district court gave a “mixed motive” jury instruction, meaning the employee
would succeed on his claim if he could prove that age was the “motivating factor” for the
employment reassignment.105 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit applied the standard utilized in the
Supreme Court decision Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,106 which provided a framework for burden
allocation in Title VII “mixed motive” cases, “when an employee alleges that he suffered an
adverse employment action because of both permissible and impermissible considerations.” 107
The Supreme Court reasoned that “motivating factor” analysis was explicit in the language of Title
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VII,108 having been added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which codified (with some alterations)
the Price Waterhouse framework.109 Under that approach, “if a Title VII plaintiff shows that
discrimination was a ‘motivating’ or a ‘substantial’ factor in the employer’s action, the burden of
persuasion should shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the same action regardless
of that impermissible consideration.”110 Before Gross, and in light of Price Waterhouse, “the new
burden-shifting approach was generally thought to apply to [Title VII and the ADEA].”111 The
Eighth Circuit found that the “mixed motive” jury instruction was incorrect because Gross could
not provide direct evidence that age was the “motivating factor” for his reassignment.112
However, the Supreme Court rejected that standard.113 Although Gross had gone to the
Court on the issue of whether “direct evidence” was needed to trigger motivating factor analysis,114
the Supreme Court avoided that question by holding that, regardless of direct evidence, “mixed
motive” analysis was inapplicable under the ADEA.115
The Court began by writing “[t]his Court has never held that this [Price Waterhouse]
burden-shifting framework applies to ADEA claims. And, we decline to do so now.”116 The Court
interpreted the core language of the ADEA, which “provides… that ‘[i]t shall be unlawful for an
employer … to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against
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any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s age.’” 117 The Court inferred the “but for” standard from this
language. Reading the italicized language to require express “but for” causation, the Court
reasoned that “[t]he ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiff may establish discrimination by
showing that age was simply a motivating factor. Moreover, Congress neglected to add such a
provision to the ADEA when it amended Title VII to add §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B),
even though it contemporaneously amended the ADEA in several ways.”118 The Court reasoned
that Congress’ failure to amend the ADEA standard to “motivating factor” was intentional.119
Additionally, the Court reasoned that the Price Waterhouse “mixed motive” framework was
difficult to apply.120
Ultimately, the Court held that, “a plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim pursuant
to the ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the ‘but for’ cause of
the challenged adverse employment action. The burden of persuasion does not shift to the
employer to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has
produced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision.”121 In so holding, the
Court was clear that the “because of” language in the ADEA was the most important reason behind
its decision to require “but for” causation.122
B. The Seventh Circuit Strays from the “But For” Standard in Goelzer v. Sheboygan
Cnty., Wis.
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A year after the Gross decision, the Seventh Circuit applied a different causation standard
in the context of a FMLA retaliation claim in Goelzer v. Sheboygan Cnty., Wis.123 In Goelzer, an
employee had taken FMLA granted medical leave several times over a four year period, and was
terminated by her employer two weeks before another scheduled FMLA leave, despite positive
performance evaluations throughout her term of employment.124 Rather than following the
Supreme Court’s “but for” causation standard as outlined in Gross, the Seventh Circuit held,
“[t]o succeed on a retaliation claim, the plaintiff does not need to prove that ‘retaliation was the
only reason for her termination; she may establish an FMLA retaliation claim by ‘showing that
the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the employer’s decision.”125 With
this language, the Seventh Circuit implicitly rejected the Gross “but for” standard in the context
of FMLA retaliation claims.126
The Goelzer decision is questionable. While the ADEA and the FMLA are different
statutes, they are similar in many respects. Both were passed by Congress to assist employees.
More importantly, the texts of both statutes are similar, although not identical. The ADEA
provides in relevant part, “it shall be unlawful for an employer … to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual … because of such
individual’s age.”127 Similarly, the relevant provision of the FMLA provides that it is unlawful
for “any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for
opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.”128 Although the FMLA does not
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explicitly use the word “because”, which is the critical distinction on which the Goelzer court
relied when differentiating itself from Gross, the FMLA uses the word “for” which
fundamentally serves the same purpose. The fact that the ADEA and FMLA do not employ the
exact same language is not dispositive since both texts serve the same purpose and are essentially
saying the same thing.
C. The Supreme Court Affirms “But For” Causation in Univ. of Texas Sw. Med.
Ctr. v. Nassar
Recently, the Supreme Court was again faced with determining the appropriate causation
standard, this time for a retaliation claim brought under Title VII in Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr.
v. Nassar.129 The Court followed its Gross decision and selected the “but for” standard as required
to maintain the goals of Title VII’s text.130 In another parallel to Gross, the Court mentioned
Congress’s 1991 amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the significance behind the
fact that “Congress has in explicit terms altered the standard of causation for … [Title VII
discrimination claims but not Title VII retaliation claims], despite the obvious opportunity to do
so in the 1991 Act.”131
The Nassar Court distinguished Title VII discrimination claims from Title VII retaliation
claims based on textual interpretations of the statute and relevant Congressional amendments.132
Nevertheless, the Nassar Court found Gross to be instructive.133 Specifically, the Court noted that
Gross provided two insights. Textually, Gross provided “the proper interpretation of the term
‘because’ as it relates to the principles of causation underlying both … [the relevant ADEA
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provision] … and … [the relevant Title VII provision].” 134

Additionally, the Court found

meaningful parallels between issues in Nassar and Gross, when considering “the significance of
Congress’ structural choices in both Title VII itself and the law’s 1991 amendments.”135
After engaging in a brief background discussion of causation, the Nassar Court turned to
Title VII’s text to determine that, like the ADEA, which was at issue in Gross, Title VII prohibits
employers from taking “adverse employment action against an employee ‘because’ of certain
criteria.” 136 The Nassar Court reasoned that, because the language of Title VII and the ADEA are
analogous, that Title VII retaliation claims require “but for” causation standard. “Given the lack
of any meaningful textual difference between the … [statutes] … the proper conclusion here, as in
Gross, is that Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for
cause of the challenged employment action.” 137 The Court then reasoned that the “but for”
standard was in line with the plain language of Title VII’s retaliation provision and the design and
structure of the entire statute.138 Additionally, the Court noted that, because the retaliation claim
is separate from a discrimination claim under Title VII, it can be held to a different causation
standard.139
The Court rejected a “motivating factor” standard for Title VII retaliation claims,
reasoning that it would be, “inconsistent with … both the text and purpose of Title VII.” 140
Congress had not added that standard in the 1991 amendment to the Civil Rights Act, and that “it
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would be inconsistent with the Gross Court’s reading (and the plain textual meaning) of the word
‘because’ as it appears in both §623(a) and §2000e-3(a).”141 Considering the text and structure of
the statute, the Court concluded that Title VII retaliation claims require “but for” causation, “not
the lessened causation test stated in [the relevant provision of a Title VII discrimination claim] …
[t]his [“but for” standard] requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in
the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.”142
With its Nassar decision, the Supreme Court followed Gross in holding that “but for”
causation is required in light of the statute’s text, which further solidifies its intention for this
standard to be applied to retaliation claims in similarly worded, but not identical, statutes like the
FMLA. In so holding, the Supreme Court cast real doubt on the Seventh Circuit as to the standard
of causation required for similar claims. It can be inferred from this recent affirmation of the “but
for” standard that the Supreme Court would apply the same standard to retaliation claims provided
by a statute similar to the ADEA and Title VII, namely, the FMLA.
C. “But For” Causation as the FMLA Standard Looking Forward
Because it was settled in Gross and Nassar that “but for” causation is the standard when
evaluating ADEA claims and Title VII retaliation claims, respectively, the question now
presented is whether FMLA retaliation claims are sufficiently similar to ADEA claims and Title
VII retaliation claims, or are they more like Title VII discrimination claims such that a “mixed
motive” or “motivating factor” causation is required. In evaluating the significance of the
Seventh Circuit’s Goelzer departure, a comparison between the ADEA, Title VII and FMLA is
required. Applying the method utilized in Gross, a textual comparison of each statute to
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consider similarity indicates the appropriate standard. Supreme Court precedent makes clear that
a statute’s use of the phrase “because of” triggers a “but for” causation standard when that statute
provides a retaliation claim. In both Gross and Nassar, the Court referenced the “because of”
language in the ADEA and Title VII, respectively, and held that the text of those statutes
required a heightened level of causation above the “motivating factor” standard.
The ADEA provides in relevant part, “it shall be unlawful for an employer … to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual …
because of such individual’s age.”143 In holding that “but for” was the appropriate standard, the
Gross court reasoned that the “because of” language meant that the statutorily protected class
was the reason for the employer conduct.144 Likewise, the relevant provision of the Title VII
retaliation language prohibits retaliation by an employer, “because [an employee] has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter.”145 The Court reasoned
that there was a “lack of any meaningful textual difference between…[the relevant provisions of
the ADEA and Title VII] … the proper conclusion is that Title VII retaliation claims require
proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.”146
The relevant provision of the FMLA provides that it is unlawful for “any employer to
discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice
made unlawful by this subchapter.”147 Although the FMLA phrasing does not explicitly say
“because of”, the word “for” essentially fulfills the same purpose. Oxford English Dictionary
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defines “for” as “because of, on account of.”148 Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines
“because” as “by reason of, on account of.”149 Failure to recognize that “because of” and “for”
in the context of these statutes serve the same purpose amounts to unnecessary and unreasonable
over-analysis. Courts have inferred from this FMLA language that the word “for” essentially
means “because of” as written in other antidiscrimination statutes. The Seventh Circuit even
drew the inference and used it to describe the standard for a FMLA retaliation claim in its
Goelzer decision: “a plaintiff must present evidence that her employer took a materially adverse
action against her because of her protected activity.”150 Thus, although the FMLA does not use
the phrase “because of”, it has been inferred that the phrase “for” is the equivalent of the
“because of” language, even though the Seventh Circuit ignored its own acknowledgement of the
similarity in Goelzer. In light of Gross and Nassar, it is likely that the Seventh Circuit’s
“motivating factor” standard will be overruled. The Court, instead, will select a “but for
standard” because the FMLA is like the ADEA and Title VII claims in Gross and Nassar. In
both Gross and Nassar the Court confirmed that the “motivating factor” standard does not apply
to retaliation claims.
IV. Conclusion
Courts should adopt the Sixth Circuit’s honest and reasonable belief standard when
considering employer motive in FMLA “interference with rights” discrimination actions.
Employees are entitled to a higher standard for adverse employment actions, as they are typically
in a more vulnerable bargaining position than employers in an “at will” employment regime. The
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Seventh Circuit has erroneously applied both the honest belief standard and the causation standard
for FMLA “retaliation claims. Rather than following the Supreme Court’s lead as outlined in
Gross, the Seventh Circuit incorrectly charted its own course when deciding the appropriate
standard for a FMLA retaliation claim was “motivating factor” causation. 151 In Gross, the
Supreme Court explicitly inferred from the 1991 Title VII amendment that Congress’s intention
was to carve out a “but for” standard for retaliation claims. 152 Before and after Goelzer was
decided, the Supreme Court has remained steady that “but for” causation is the standard for ADEA
claims and Title VII retaliation claims, statutes similar to the FMLA. Upon review of the texts of
the ADEA, Title VII, and the FMLA, it is clear that the language indicating the appropriate
causation standard is sufficiently similar, as the “because of” language in ADEA and Title VII
serves the same purpose as the word “for” in the FMLA. As such, if confronted with an
opportunity to settle the causation standard for a FMLA claim, the Supreme Court will likely hold
against the Seventh Circuit and rule that the “but for” causation standard as it applied to an ADEA
claim in Gross and a Title VII retaliation claim in Nassar is the appropriate standard to be applied
to a FMLA retaliation claim because of textual and policy driven similarities between the statutes.
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